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CONVERGENCES AND DIVERGENCES IN
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL NORMS ON MIGRANT
LABOR
Chantal Thomast
INTRODUCTION: IMPLICATIONS OF PLURAL LEGALITIES
Multiple international legal regimes'-in human rights law, refugee
law, labor law, trade law and criminal law-address, to some degree, the
rights and privileges that should be accorded to aliens working within the
territories of states parties. Even within these particular subject areas, let
alone between them, however, "little has been done" in the way of
synthesis.2
This "substance without architecture"' in international migration law
may result in part from institutional costs of harmonization, the obstacles of
path-dependency, or the simple lack of political will. In addition, there may
be valid reasons for the lack of a coherent regime, if the "sites and topics of
t Professor of Law, Cornell Law School. Thanks to all those who participated in the workshop
in which the original basis for this paper was presented, "Human Rights: Global Legal Pluralism
Revisited," Thursday, July 26, 2007, Law and Society Annual Meeting, Berlin. Thanks also to the
invaluable comments and support of the members of the Labor Law and Development Research
Network and especially to Adelle Blackett.
1. Sally Merry has defined legal pluralism as a "a situation in which two or more legal systems
coexist in the same social field." Sally Engle Merry, Legal Pluralism, 22 L. & Soc'Y REV. 869, 870
(1988). This essay considers the "plural legalities" at the international level, understood as the product
of multiple overlapping treaties, each of which is actually or potentially (depending on ratification
status) formally binding on the state. As such, the focus of this essay departs from that of other
treatments of legal pluralism which look to the interplay between binding state law and competing non-
binding norms from, for example, codes of corporate conduct or other corporate practices that may
constitute "labor law without the state," Harry W. Arthurs, Labour Law Without the State, 46 U.
TORONTO L.J. 1(1996). For an example of such analysis, see Adelle Blackett, Global Governance,
Legal Pluralism & the Decentered State: A Labor Law Critique of Codes of Corporate Conduct, 8 IND.
J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 401 (2001). For a discussion of legal pluralism as a framework for the analysis
of international law, see, e.g., William Burke-White, International Legal Pluralism, 25 MICH. J. INT'L L.
963 (2003); Paul Schiff Berman, Global Legal Pluralism, 80 SO. CAL. L. REv. 1155 (2007).
2. See DAVID WEISSBRODT, THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF NON-CITIZENS 36 (2008) (discussing
international human rights law); see also RAINER BAUBOCK, MIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP: LEGAL
STATUS, RIGHTS AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION 37 (2006) ("Assessing how international human rights
norms shape domestic immigrant policies... is more difficult and has been a relatively neglected area of
research").
3. T. Alexander Aleinikoff, International Legal Norms on Migration: Substance Without
Architecture, in INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION LAW: DEVELOPING PARADIGMS AND CHALLENGES 467
(Ryszard Cholewinski, Richard Perruchoud & Euan MacDonald eds., 2007).
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governance [are] simply too diffuse to permit" one.4 However, the
vulnerable social position of migrant workers also raises the danger that
their interests are most likely to fall through the cracks of such a
patchworked legal order.
Comprehending the effects of multiple legal regimes arising at
domestic, regional, and international levels is of course a difficult business,
and the challenge of doing so reacts differently with different
jurisprudential sensibilities: whereas some see the gradual accretion of
global constitutionalism5  or at least a welcome form of regulatory
competition, 6 others warn of the destructive effects of fragmentation.7
Mindful of such debates, this essay investigates the international
regulatory terrain affecting migration. In seeking to contribute to that
effort, this essay takes up some of the underlying preoccupations of legal
pluralism, which help to shed light on some of the larger questions at stake
beyond the particulars. There are, to begin with, the doctrinal questions
related to positive law. Central to the doctrinal analysis is the question of
whether, or more precisely, where, rules from multiple regimes converge or
diverge.' While some excellent scholarship has surveyed international
4. Id. at 479.
5. The vision of international constitutionalism arising out of the gradual accretion of norms and
institutions on the basis of cumulative political deliberation emerges from JORGEN HABERMAS,
BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS (1990). For a discussion of Habermasian constitutionalism, see Thomas
Giegerich, The Is and the Ought of International Constitutionalism: How Far Have We Come on
Habermas's Road to a "Well-Considered Constitutionalization ofInternational Law"?, 10 GERMAN L.J.
31 (2009). For other discussions of European constitutionalism, see ALEC STONE SWEET, THE JUDICIAL
CONSTRUCTION OF EUROPE (2004); JOSEPH H.H.WEILER, THE CONSTITUTION OF EUROPE: "Do THE
NEW CLOTHES HAVE AN EMPEROR" AND OTHER ESSAYS ON EUROPEAN INTEGRATION (1999). For the
constitutionalist line within international economic law, see ERNST-ULRICH PETERSMANN,
CONSTITUTIONAL FUNCTIONS AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW
(1991); for a discussion of the literature, see Jeffrey L. Dunoff, Why Constitutionalism Now? Text,
Context and the Historical Contingency ofIdeas, 1 J. INT'L L. & INT'L REL. 191, 192 (2005).
6. Joel P. Trachtman, Regulatory Competition and Regulatory Jurisdiction, 3 J. INT'L ECON. L.
331 (2000).
7. For an indication of the debate, see INT'L LAW COMM'N, UNITED NATIONS, FRAGMENTATION
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: DIFFICULTIES ARISING FROM THE DIVERSIFICATION AND EXPANSION OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 12 (2006) (UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.682, 13 Apr. 2006), available at
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/documentationlenglish/a cn4_1682.pdf ("Some commentators have been
highly critical of what they have seen as the erosion of general international law, emergence of
conflicting jurisprudence, forum-shopping and loss of legal security. Others have seen here a
predominantly technical problem that has emerged naturally with the increase of international legal
activity and may be controlled by the use of technical streamlining and coordination."). Andreas
Fischer-Lescano & Gunther Teubner, Regime-Collisions: The Vain Search for Legal Unity in the
Fragmentation of Global Law, 25 MICH. J. INT'L L. 999, 1004 (2004); Martti Koskenniemi & Paivi
Leino, Fragmentation ofInternational Law: Postmodern Anxieties?, 15 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 553 (2002).
8. The work in a related field, citizenship, has made more progress in achieving comprehensive
analysis of convergence and divergence in law and policy. For a general discussion of research on
citizenship law and policy and the question of convergence, see MIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP: LEGAL
STATUS, RIGHTS AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION 44 (Rainer Baubcck ed., 2006). For examples of a
framework informed by pluralism, see CITIZENSHIP TODAY: GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE AND PRACTICE (T.
Alexander Aleinikoff& Douglas Klusmeyer eds., 2001).
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migration law,9 few treatments have attempted to sharpen the analysis
through inquiry into convergence and divergence around specific norms and
principles. Section I of this essay seeks to chart out an initial such analysis,
conducting a concise comparison of particular rules affecting migrant
workers from different realms of international law. Section I concludes
with both a graphic representation of doctrinal convergences and
divergences, and a further discussion the doctrinal relationships among
treaties as elucidated through consideration of hypothetical legal disputes.' 0
The article considers the convergence/divergence question not only on
the level of positive law and doctrine but also at the level of normative
analysis. Attention to laws as norms gives proper place to the axiom
recognized across numerous domains-from constitutionalists" to critical
theorists12 to social scientists 3-that the ideas that laws attempt to embody
or enforce harbor their own power, as aspirations towards our higher
selvesl4 or as evidence of our limitations and fears. International lawyers
know this perhaps best of all, as the salience of international legal rules as
norms can precede or exceed their effectiveness as rules of positive law.
Labor of course particularly lends itself to this convergence/divergence
analysis. Though international labor law, and most centrally the
International Labor Organization, have occupied an historically primary
role in establishing legal standards on the treatment of workers, over the
postwar era and in particular in the late twentieth century's era of
globalization, 5 multiple regimes in other domains of international law have
established rules and practices that significantly affect labor. The
proliferation of international rules affecting labor has also created political
and philosophical tensions: though an international trade perspective might
view labor in purely economic terms, such a view is sharply limited by
competing conceptions in the international legal order that emphasize the
humanity and dignity of workers and that object to the commodification of
labor. 16
9. See, e.g., MIGRATION AND INTERNATIONAL LEGAL NORMS (T. Alexander Aleinikoff &
Vincent Chetail eds., 2003); JOEL P. TRACHTMAN, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF ECONOMIC
MIGRATION: TOWARD THE FOURTH FREEDOM (2009); DAVID WEISSBRODT, THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF
NON-CITIZENS 36 (2008).
10. See infra Section II.F.
11. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE (1985).
12. See, e.g., MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE ARCHAEOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE (A.M. Sheridan Smith
trans., 2002).
13. See, e.g., DOUGLASS NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE (1990); ALEXANDER WENDT, SOCIAL THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1999).
14. For treatments of the tension between natural conceptions of morality and justice and positivist
rationality, see ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE (1981); JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW
(1979).
15. See, e.g., BOB HEPPLE, LABOR LAWS AND GLOBAL TRADE 33 (2005).
16. E.g., INT'L LAB. ORG., DECLARATION OF PHILADELPHIA (1944) ("labor is not a commodity").
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This essay will argue that even where disparate treaties converge
doctrinally, they may diverge normatively and that normative divergence
may be significant in its own right. Section II considers the normative
implications of divergent rule systems. In particular, Section II raises the
question of whether the rise of international criminal law, combating forms
of illegal migration such as migrant smuggling and trafficking in persons,
may support a normative divergence in international migration law between
the primacy of the rights of individuals, on the one hand, and the primacy of
states, on the other. This normative tension in turn marks a rift still greater
than those between trade and labor, or labor and human rights: it represents
the polarities of liberal legalism as a jurisprudential framework ultimately
transcending sovereignty, or one that protects and legitimates sovereignty.
This kind of normative analysis is, of course, highly stylized. Legal
regimes do not stand for only one set of norms, but rather reflect contested
and complicated histories. International labor law, for example, harbors
tensions between the "economic and the social," that is to say, an emphasis
on particular industrial and workplace contexts versus broader aspirations
toward justice. 17 Moreover, even where particular principles predominate,
this should not be taken to discount the importance of political economy,
self-interested bargaining, and historical contingency in allowing those
norms to prevail or in influencing the particular ways in which norms
continue to develop and change over time.
Finally, a consideration of norms explicitly articulated by the treaties
or laws in question does not begin to describe their full effect, and formal
principles often create substantive effects sharply at odds with their own
terms. The treaty regimes analyzed in this article should be studied not
only in terms of their internal complexities but also in their external "real-
world" impact. Such an analysis is beyond the scope of this essay.
Nevertheless, by mapping the array of international legal regimes across
human rights, trade, labor, and crime that affect migration, and in
describing some of their prevalent doctrinal and normative characteristics, it
is hoped that the article might contribute to emerging scholarship on this
topic.
I. DOCTRINAL CONVERGENCES AND DIVERGENCES
The central principle in liberal legalism's self-understanding is formal
equality, and it is reflected in international law's enshrinement of the
doctrine of nondiscrimination. In international human rights law,
17. See, e.g., Adelle Blackett & Colleen Sheppard, Collective Bargaining and Equality: Making
Connections, 142 INT'L LAB. REV. 419 (2003).
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individuals are entitled to nondiscrimination by virtue of their irreducible
equality as human beings; in international economic law, nondiscrimination
arises from a commitment to the benefits of trade. In international labor
law, individuals are entitled as workers to nondiscrimination in their
enjoyment of protections that enable the pursuit of "material well-being ...
in conditions of freedom and dignity, of economic security and equal
opportunity."'8 The precise contours of the right to nondiscrimination arise
in these key areas: the right of territorial entry;' 9 the general right to
nondiscrimination;20 the right to work and conditions of work;2' freedoms
of expression, association and assembly; 22 and criminal due process. 23
There are both convergences and divergences around the central
principle of nondiscrimination, and particular aspects of it relevant to
migrant workers' experiences, in the leading multilateral treaties.24  The
remainder of this section proceeds in two stages: subsections A-E provide
a fairly close and relatively technical doctrinal exposition and analysis.
This kind of detailed comparison across human rights, trade, labor, and
crime recimes does not yet exist in the literature. Subsection F then
synthesizes and summarizes around doctrinal convergences and divergences
concluding with a detailed examination of potential doctrinal conflicts.
* Human rights: In the area of human rights, the two 1964
Covenants, the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR, or the "Civil and Political Covenant") 25 and
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights (ICESCR, or "Economic Covenant") set forth standards
on the principle of nondiscrimination generally, and also on
particular aspects of worker rights.
Beyond these two general covenants, several specialized
human rights treaties also. The 1965 International Convention
on Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD or the "Racial
18. ILO, supra note 18.
19. See infra Section I.A.
20. See infra Section I.B.
21. See infra Section I.C.
22. See infra Section I.D.
23. See infra Section I.E.
24. International law is greatly complicated by the existence of regional and bilateral treaties,
which are only occasionally addressed in this essay. In addition, the multilateral treaties themselves are
subject to highly varying levels of ratification and assortments of reservations. Finally, of course,
international norms are implemented differently within particular national legal systems. Thus, this
exercise can do no more than offer an initial and instructive example of this analytical framework,
hopefully demonstrating its utility. A fuller examination of the applicable transnational norms within
any particular system is beyond the scope of this essay.
25. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), U.N. Doc.
A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966) [hereinafter Civil and Political Covenant].
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Discrimination Convention") 26 has weighed in on particular
types of discrimination that can affect migrants. The 1951
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (the "Refugee
Convention") 27 set an important benchmark for the treatment
of migrants fleeing political persecution. Most recently, the
1990 Convention on the Rights of Migrant Workers and Their
Families (ICRMW or "Migrant Workers' Convention")
addresses the plight of migrant workers specifically. 28
* Labor: Predating human rights treaties are the treaties of the
International Labor Organization, which include the
Convention on the Freedom of Association and Protection of
the Right to Organize,29 the Convention on the Right to
Organize and Collective Bargaining,0 the Convention on
Discrimination, ' and the other "core" treaties recognized in
the ILO's 1998 Declaration on Fundamental Principles and
Rights at Work.32 The ILO has also adopted two specialized
treaties on migrant workers, the 1949 Migration for
Employment Convention,33 and the 1975 Migrant Workers
(Supplementary Provisions) Convention.34
* Trade: The World Trade Organization (WTO), which is the
1995 successor to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT), includes the General Agreement on Trade in Services
(GATS).3 ' GATS addresses labor as it relates to the provision
of services by foreign nationals. Since the provision of
services need not entail the movement of an actual person
26. General Recommendation XIV, Definition of Discrimination (22 Mar. 1993) U.N. Doc.
A/48/18 (Mar. 22, 1993) [hereinafter Racial Discrimination Convention].
27. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees art. 24(1), 189 U.N.T.S. 137 (July 28, 1951)[hereinafter Refugee Convention].
28. International Covenant on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members
of Their Families, G.A. Res. 45/158, Doc. AIRES/45/158 (Dec. 18, 1990) [hereinafter Migrant Workers'
Convention].
29. Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize Convention, July 9, 1948, 68
U.N.T.S. 17 (entered into force July 4, 1950).
30. Right to Organize and Collective Bargaining Convention, July 1, 1949, 96 U.N.T.S. 257(entered into force July 18, 1951).
31. Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention, June 25, 1958, 362 U.N.T.S. 31(entered into force June 15, 1960).
32. ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, June 18, 1998, 37 I.L.M.
1233 (1998).
33. Migration for Employment Convention (Revised), July 1, 1949, 120 U.N.T.S. 70 (entered into
force Jan. 22, 1952) [hereinafter ILO Migration for Employment Convention].
34. Migrant Workers (Supplementary Provisions) Convention, June 24, 1965, 1120 U.N.T.S. 324(entered into force Dec. 9, 1978) [hereinafter ILO Supplementary Provisions Convention].
35. General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing
the World Trade Organization, Annex lB, 1869 U.N.T.S. 183, 33 1.L.M. 1167, 1187 (1994) [hereinafter
GATS].
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across a national border, not all categories, or "Modes," of
GATS rules are relevant: within the GATS framework the
most relevant is the framework addressing the Temporary
Movement of Natural Persons ("Mode 4").36
* Crime: In 2000, a new complex of multilateral agreements
was negotiated at Palermo under the auspices of the Vienna-
based UN Office on Drugs and Crime Control: the
Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime (the
"Crime Convention") 37 and two Protocols, the "Migrant
Smuggling Protocol"38  and the "Trafficking in Persons
Protocol."39
Though the treaties listed above have varied structures and substantive
orientations, they each potentially address the experience of the migrant
worker, and can be examined on the basis of whether and how they permit
differential treatment on the basis of citizenship status (i.e., non-citizen but
documented) or documentary status (i.e., non-citizen and undocumented).
A. Nondiscrimination in the Right of Territorial Entry
Most labor rights relate to the experiences of workers who are actively
employed in the state party in question, but there is the preliminary question
of entering the territory. It is an enduring feature of modernity, and a
generally-though not universally-accepted paradox, 40 that in a liberal-
legal world that champions the principle of nondiscrimination as
foundational, the state nevertheless may make distinctions among persons
seeking to enter its territory.41 International law generally reflects this
normative commitment to sovereignty, so that there is no "right to
immigrate."42 From a traditional perspective, the notion of a right to enter
36. GATS defines "Mode 4" as "the supply of a service by a service supplier of one Member,
through presence of natural persons of a Member in the territory of any other Member." GA TS, supra
note 37, art I, 2(d).
37. Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, G.A. Res. 55/25, Annex 1, 55 U.N. Doc.
A/45/49/Annex I (Nov. 15, 2000) [hereinafter Crime Convention].
38. Protocol Against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, Supplementing the United
Nations Convention Against Transnational Crime, G.A. Res. 55/25, Annex III, U.N. Doc.
A/45/49/Annex III (Nov. 15, 2000) [hereinafter Migrant-Smuggling Convention].
39. Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and
Children, Supplementing the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, G.A.
Res. 25, Annex II, U.N. Doc. A/45/49/Annex II (Nov. 15, 2000) [hereinafter Trafficking Protocol].
40. See KEVIN R. JOHNSON, OPENING THE FLOODGATES: WHY AMERICA NEEDS TO RETHINK ITS
BORDERS AND IMMIGRATION LAWS (2007).
41. See infra Section II for further discussion of the normative.
42. Seyla Benhabib & Judith Resnik, Introduction: Citizenship and Migration Theory
Engendered, in MIGRATIONS AND MOBILITIES I (Seyla Benhabib & Judith Resnik eds., 2009) (citing the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights an example of foundational principles of contemporary
international law, and noting that it does not specify a right to immigrate); TRACHTMAN, supra note 10,
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the territory of a sovereign state appears nonsensical, so deeply entrenched
is the principle of territoriality as a feature of sovereignty. However, this
basic recognition of sovereignty is not absolute. Exceptions in international
law assert differing degrees of variance from the principle of sovereign
territorial control.
The "strongest" exception to sovereign territorial control stems from
international refugee law. Asylum seekers and refugees often enter the
workforce and in some cases can contribute significantly to the migrant
labor supply.43  For this reason, the central treaty to the international
framework of refugee law, the Refugee Convention, provides refugees with
both political and economic rights relevant to work.4 Because it addresses
individuals who presumably find themselves in conditions of extreme
duress, the Refugee Convention also effectively protects the right of
territorial entry for asylum seekers, by requiring states to admit them at
least on a temporary basis while refugee status determination takes place.45
Beyond this most assertive exception, in several cases international
law recognizes the state's fundamental authority to screen immigrants, but
constrains those procedures according to the principle of nondiscrimination.
For example, although the Racial Discrimination Convention explicitly
exempts from sanction the "distinction between citizens and non-
citizens," 46 the UN body responsible for interpreting the Convention has
specifically invalidated racial discrimination in immigration criteria.47 The
at 172 ("Generally, of course, there is no obligation in customary international law or in human rights
law to treat foreign persons as well as nationals in connection with admission") (emphasis in original).
43. For one case study of the overlap between asylum seeker and migrant worker populations, see
Chantal Thomas, Migrant Domestic Workers in Egypt, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. 987 (2010).
44. See infra I.C.
45. Refugee Convention, supra note 29, at art 31 ("Contracting States shall not impose penalties ...
on refugees who, coming directly from a territory where their life or freedom was threatened .. . enter or
are present in a territory without authorization, provided they present themselves without delay to the
authorities and show good cause for their illegal entry or presence." Interpretations by the Executive
Committee of the UNHCR have further clarified that states have an obligation to admit asylum seekers
at least on a temporary basis in order to adhere to the principle of non-refoulement. See U.N. HIGH
COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, EXCOM CONCLUSION NO. 6 ON NON-REFOULEMENT (1977)(reaffirming "the fundamental importance of the observance of the principle of non-refoulement-both at
the border and within the territory of a State of persons who may be subjected to persecution if returned
to their country of origin irrespective of whether or not they have been formally recognized as
refugees"); U.N. HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, ExCOM CONCLUSION NO. 8 ON DETERMINATION
OF REFUGEE STATUS (1977) (laying out guidelines that would allow states to comply with the principle
of non-refoulement, including the obligation to allow an asylum-seeker to remain in the territory at least
temporarily while her refugee status is determined); U.N. HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, EXCOM
CONCLUSION NO. 22 ON THE CESSATION OF STATUS (1981) (reaffirming that even in cases of "large-
scale influx, asylum seekers should be admitted to the State in which they first seek refugee... at least on
a temporary basis").
46. Racial Discrimination Convention, supra note 28, at art 1(2)). States Parties retain control
over determining citizenship, as long as there is no discrimination against any particular nationality. Id.
at art 1(3).
47. See id. 1 2. See also David Weissbrodt, The Protection of Non-Citizens in International
Human Rights Law, in INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION LAW: DEVELOPING PARADIGMS AND CHALLENGES
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Human Rights Committee, which monitors the Civil and Political
Covenant, recognizes the right of States' parties to decide "in principle"
who enters their borders, 4 8 has also recognized that the right of States to
authorize territorial entry should be constrained by concerns of
nondiscrimination.49
Whereas the human rights regimes more concerned with traditional
civil and political equality have extended themselves to the issue of
discrimination in immigration, those aspects of international law concerned
with individual economic and social rights have demonstrated more
deference. In some cases, such as the Economic Covenant, the position
maintained is one of diplomatic silence.50  In the case of the labor rights
conventions, both the UN Migrant Workers' Convention, and the ILO
migrant labor conventions, reaffirm the state's prerogative over
immigration51 and exhort states to better enforce it so as to combat illegal
immigration.52
221, 225 (Ryszard Cholewinski, Richard Perruchoud & Euan MacDonald eds., 2007); see Committee on
the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, CERD/C/64/Misc.11/rev.3, Feb. 23-Mar. 12, 2004
("xenophobia against non-nationals, particularly migrants, refugees and asylum-seekers, constitutes one
of the main sources of contemporary racism . . differential treatment based on citizenship or
immigration status will constitute discrimination if the criteria for such differentiation, judged in the
light of the objectives and purposes of the Convention, are not applied pursuant to a legitimate aim").
48. The Civil and Political Covenant "does not recognize the right of aliens to enter or to reside in
the territory of a State party. It is in principle a matter for the State to decide who it will admit to its
territory." Civil and Political Covenant, supra note 27. See Comment, Office of the High
Commissioner of Human Rights, General Comment on the Position of Aliens Under the Covenant, Apr.
11, 1986, available at http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/O/bc561aa8lbc5d86ecl2563edOO4aaalb
[hereinafter Position ofA liens].
A definitive discussion of the status of non-citizens under UN and regional human rights treaties is
found in WEISSBRODT, supra note 3. Professor Weissbrodt was also the Special Rapporteur for the UN
on the rights of non-citizens.
49. Position of Aliens, supra note 50. The Human Rights Committee only generally stated
concerns of "non-discrimination, prohibition of inhuman treatment and respect for family life," but has
declined to specify further.
Note that what is discussed in the text is only the right of territorial entry, not other issues related to
territoriality such as acquisition of citizenship or residence authorization. For a detailed discussion of
these issues, including the cases in which human rights bodies have allowed some forms of ethnic or
linguistic discrimination, see WEISSBRODT, supra note 3.
50. WEISSBRODT, supra note 3, at 190 ("Unlike the Civil and Political Covenant, the Economic
Covenant's monitoring body has not yet issued a comment clearly stating that the non-discrimination
provision protects migrants.")
51. Migrant Workers' Convention, supra note 30, at art 35 ("Nothing in the present part of the
Convention shall be interpreted as implying the regularization of the situation of migrant workers or
members of their families who are non-documented or in an irregular situation or any right to such
regularization of their situation").
52. Id. at art. 68 ("States Parties, including States of transit, shall collaborate with a view to
preventing and eliminating illegal or clandestine movements and employment of migrant workers in an
irregular situation."); ILO Supplementary Provisions Convention, supra note 36, at art. 3 (requiring
states to "suppress clandestine movements of migrants for employment"). Indeed the ILO Convention
goes so far as to call for greater enforcement of border control (id. at Art 2, requiring each signatory to
"determine whether there are illegally employed migrant workers on its territory"; Id. at art. 3, requiring
signatories to adopt measures to "suppress clandestine movements of migrants for employment and
illegal employment of migrants"; Id. at art. 6 ("Provision shall be made under national laws or
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The basis for this divergence between civil and political rights, and
economic and social rights, stems from differences in surrounding context
and rationale. In the case of the latter, considerations of political will and
the need to avoid the treaty's rejection by antisocialist states may have
informed the greater deference. In addition to this essentially negative
reason, however, lies both the positive concern for the well-being of all
workers, and the desire to avoid the erosion of some workers' bargaining
power through the presence of others more easily exploitable.
Coming to international trade, the World Trade Organization does
generally reserve to members the right to "regulate the entry" of workers
who would otherwise be covered under the General Agreement on Trade in
Services, in the GATS Annex on the Movement of Natural Persons.54 For
workers who are employed in temporary contracts under sectors that
Members have included in their specific commitments, Members can
regulate entry only provided that such regulation does not "nullify or impair
the benefits" accorded by that commitment.ss That is, if particular sectors
have been included under GATS's other commitments, workers "shall be
allowed to provide" those services and any entry regulations would not be
permitted to bar them from doing so.56 This obligation still generally
preserves the territorial sovereignty of Members: it just means that they
regulations for the effective detection of the illegal employment of migrant workers and for the
definition and the application of administrative, civil and penal sanctions")).
53. Awareness of the negative effect of differences in labor standards on the preservation of labor
standards-in other words, the danger of a "race to the bottom" driven by competition-has appeared
with regularity in the history and text of the ILO. See, e.g., NICOLAS VALTICOS, INTERNATIONAL
LABOUR LAW 20 (1979) ("One of the oldest ideas advanced in favor of international conventions in the
field of labour was that of international competition... international agreements in the field of labour
would avoid international competition from taking place to the disadvantage of workers, by a kind of
inhuman 'dumping."'). The importance of uniform minimum standards below which labor markets
cannot go is reflected in the 1919 ILO constitution ("the failure of any nation to adopt human conditions
of labour is an obstacle in the way of other nations which desire to improve the conditions in their own
countries" and in the 1944 ILO Declaration of Philadelphia ("poverty anywhere constitutes a danger to
prosperity everywhere."). The ILO's position on competition modified over the years toward an
endorsement of "constructive competition." See BOB HEPPLE, LABOR LAWS AND GLOBAL TRADE 33
(2005) (explaining that the "argument for international standards as a means of regularing competition"
was more prominent in the ILO's founding than in subsequent eras). Nevertheless, even in this more
moderate context international standards are deemed important in "preventing destructive competition."
Id. (emphasis added). Although the Migration for Employment Convention addresses workers of
disparate nationalities in a single market, as opposed to workers across disparate nations, a similar logic
would seem to apply.
54. General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing
the World Trade Organization, Annex on Movement of Natural Persons Supplying Services Under the
Agreement, 1869 U.N.T.S. 183, 33 I.L.M. 1167, 1187 (1994) [hereinafter MONP Annex], 14.
55. See id; see also TRACHTMAN, supra note 10, at 247.
56. Joel Trachtman interprets the MONP Annex to establish a higher standard than only "does not
nullify or impair"; he would also add a "necessity test" i.e. that the entry regulation would need to be
necessary which has been interpreted to mean the least possible trade restrictive. TRACHTMAN, supra
note 10, at 244 (considering past WTO jurisprudence).
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cannot give commitments under the schedules but then take them away with
onerous entry requirements.
The GATS does recognize the WTO's general requirement of
nondiscrimination among Members (the "most-favored nation principle").
However, it also specifies that Members can, at the least, impose
differential visa requirements for nationals of different Members.5 7
Whereas treaty bodies have interpreted international civil and political
rights to bar discrimination in immigration criteria, the trade law of the
GATS would appear to establish a weaker non-discrimination constraint,
albeit one that at least theoretically could apply to any non-visa immigration
requirements that differentiate on the basis of nationality.
In addition to these explicit constraints on the sovereign prerogative of
territorial control, international law has created an implicit, but ultimately
more powerful, constraint in some cases by decoupling the right to
authorize entry with the rights enjoyed by workers once in a state's
territory. In some cases, the fact of unlawful entry or residence does not
necessarily deprive migrant workers of certain rights under international
law, as is discussed in the next sections.
B. The General Right to Nondiscrimination
Once migrants have entered the territory, there are several specific
categories of enumerated rights that are relevant to their experiences as
workers: there are the civil and political rights related to trade union
organizing; economic and social rights related to minimum standards and
conditions of work; and criminal process rights. These are discussed below
in turn, and treaties vary in their substantive expressions in each of these
categories. Apart from these more specific rights, however, there is the
general question of the scope of nondiscrimination as a general, catchall
principle applying to migrant workers.
In the area of human rights, both the Civil and Political Covenant, and
the Economic Covenant, recognize the general right of all human beings to
nondiscrimination without distinction based on national origin, birth or
"other status."58  The Human Rights Committee has clarified that "other
status" in the Civil and Political Covenant includes the distinction between
57. See MONP Annex, supra note 56, at n.1 ("the sole fact of requiring a visa for natural persons of
certain Members and not for those of others shall not be regarded as nullifying or impairing benefits
under" GATS obligations). In addition, Members appear to retain total control over measures specifying
residence and permanent employment requirements, as well as over workers who are seeking
employment rather than already employed. Id. 1 3.
58. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI)
(Dec. 16, 1966), at art. 2(2) [hereinafter Economic Covenant]; Civil and Political Covenant, supra note
27, at arts. 2(1) & 26.
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citizens and aliens, 9 with only a narrow exception for the right to vote.60
Moreover, this equality extends to undocumented immigrants as well,
according to the Committee, with only one exception of the right to
freedom of movement. 61  As with the right of entry described above, the
Economic Covenant is much more circumspect: the UN Committee on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has declined to comment on the
application of the Economic Covenant rights to non-nationals more
generally. Moreover, the treaty explicitly grants developing countries the
right to exclude non-nationals.62
In the case of the Migrant Workers' Convention, the question of
nondiscrimination between citizens and aliens does not arise because, by
definition of its scope, the Convention applies only to aliens. The question
then is whether there may be discrimination among classes of aliens. The
same term that exists in the Covenants, "other status," is used to define the
Convention's scope of application of the Migrant Workers' Convention, but
with the important qualification "except as otherwise provided hereafter," 63
and the "hereafter" in question clearly demarcates rights into those that
apply to all workers regardless of documentary status, 64 and those that
59. General Comment 15 on the Position of Aliens under the Covenant (Apr. 11, 1986), T 1,
reproduced in UN Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1. The Comment states that "the general rule is that each one
of the rights of the Covenant must be guaranteed without discrimination between citizens and aliens
[but] ... the Committee's experience in examining reports shows that in a number of countries ... rights
that aliens should enjoy under the Covenant are denied to them or are subject to limitations that cannot
always be justified under the Covenant." ("Reports from States have often failed to take into account
that each State party must ensure the rights in the Covenant to 'all individuals within its territory and
subject to its jurisdiction' (art.2(l)). In general, the rights set forth in the Covenant apply to everyone,
irrespective of reciprocity, and irrespective of his or her nationality or statelessness."). Id.
60. David Weissbrodt, The Protection of Non-Citizens in International Human Rights Law, in
INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION LAW: DEVELOPING PARADIGMS AND CHALLENGES 224 (Ryszard
Cholewinski, Richard Perruchoud & Euan MacDonald eds., 2007). Although this principle is
sweepingly stated, several commentators have observed that more could be done to enunciate its
content. See id. at 233; T. Alexander Aleinikoff, International Legal Norms on Migration: Substance
without Architecture, in INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION LAW: DEVELOPING PARADIGMS AND
CHALLENGES 469 (Ryszard Cholewinski, Richard Perruchoud & Euan MacDonald eds., 2007).
61. General Comment 15 states that "[o]nce an alien is lawfully within a territory, his freedom of
movement within the territory and his right to leave that territory may only be restricted in accordance
with article 12(3)." Since this is the only place where lawful status is explicitly mentioned, one can be
even more confident in interpreting the lack of explicit mention as intentional. This would support the
application of the nondiscrimination principle regardless of lawful status. The familiar canon of legal
interpretation, exclusio unio inclusio alterius can be applied to conclude that the fact that lawful status is
mentioned here but not elsewhere suggests that with respect to the other principles, lawful status is not a
basis for distinction. This interpretation is supported by David Weissbrodt, The Protection of Non-
Citizens in International Human Rights Law, in INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION LAW: DEVELOPING
PARADIGMS AND CHALLENGES 224 (Ryszard Cholewinski, Richard Perruchoud, & Euan MacDonald
eds., 2007) ("The ICCPR contains a narrow exception to... equality for non-citizens with respect to ...
the right to vote; and freedom of movement . .. which may be denied to undocumented immigrants").
62. Economic Covenant, supra note 60, at art 2(3).
63. Migrant Workers' Convention, supra note 30, at Art 1.
64. Id. Part III.
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apply to migrant workers who are "documented or in a regular situation."65
Although there is a separate sub-section preceding the lists of substantive
rights that exists solely to set forth a general non-discrimination
commitment, 66 that general principle cannot apply to documentary status
given the treaty's allocation of substantive rights explicitly on the basis of
documentary status.67  The "rights provided for in the present
Convention"68 do distinguish between documented and undocumented
workers, providing to the documented workers rights relating to access to
educational, vocational, housing, and health institutions and services, as
well as certain labor protections. 69
The Racial Discrimination Convention asserts a sweeping
nondiscrimination provision including "other status" and does, as
interpreted by the treaty body, apply to immigration and citizenship criteria
linked to race, descent, or national origin.70 If there is no discrimination on
this sort of identity basis, however, the Convention explicitly backs off of
the distinction between citizens and aliens.71
Again, there is convergence and divergence with apparently an
underlying political trade-off in each of these treaties on human rights. The
most far-reaching of the treaties is the Civil and Political Covenant. The
Racial Discrimination Convention stops short of the line that the Civil and
Political Covenant draws, perhaps trading off more explicit commitments
on the sensitive issues of race and ethnicity for another mode of "out-
group" discrimination against non-citizens more generally. The Economic
Covenant, with its yet more controversial orientation toward economically
redistributive justice, expresses more deference still to sovereign
prerogatives over citizenship and its exclusiveness.
Within international trade law, the norm of nondiscrimination is
expressed in two key principles: that of most-favored nation treatment,
which requires states parties to treat nationals of all other states parties
equally; and that of national treatment, which requires a state party to
forego preferential treatment of its own nationals. In its jurisprudence
related to trade in goods, the WTO's interpretation of the nondiscrimination
norm has been strikingly expansive, with much more liberal approaches to
proving discrimination than, for example, would be the case in U.S.
65. Id Part IV.
66. Id Part II.
67. See infra Section II.C. for more detail on which rights are provided to documented and which
to undocumented workers.
68. Migrant Workers' Convention, supra note 30, at art. 7.
69. Id at art 43.
70. Racial Discrimination Convention, supra note 28, at art. 1(1).
71. Id. at art 1(2) ("This Convention shall not apply to distinctions, exclusions, restrictions or
preferences made by a State Party .. .between citizens and non-citizens.").
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constitutional law. The breadth of these principles perhaps explains why
their initial scope was rather limited, to tariffs and other technical "border"
measures affecting trade, and expanded only after several decades. Indeed,
the GATS, with its application to labor, was enacted only in 1994 with the
succession by the World Trade Organization of the original General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.
Reflecting this particular balancing dynamic, the GATS retains the
broad statements of most-favored nation treatment and national treatment.
Although, the general most-favored nation treatment principle applies with
only a few exemptions to trade in services,72 the more politically and
economically sensitive national treatment principle (which entails
competition between nationals and foreigners) applies only to those sectors
falling specifically within states parties' specific commitments. These
commitments can be quite specific indeed, so that states retain virtually
complete control over their exposure. Once the specific commitment has
been made, the principle of national treatment applies in its broad form
within that constraint.
The ILO Migration for Employment Convention and Supplementary
Provisions Convention make no generalized call for nondiscrimination,
beyond the latter's reminder of the obligation of states parties to "respect
the basic human rights of all migrant workers." 73  Apart from this, the
principle of nondiscrimination as stated in these is limited to particular and
listed rights related to the workplace, 74 as opposed to the generalized
language that exists in the human rights treaties. Moreover, the ILO rights
are once again carefully limited to lawful workers only, 75 removing the
question of extending worker rights to irregular migrants with the key
exception of terms and conditions of work "arising out of past
employment." 76 This exception is important because it indicates the ILO
sensibility: on the one hand, more pragmatic and deferential to states'
ability to determine the right to enter; and on the other hand, with a focus
on equalizing bargaining power across workers. 77  This carefully limited
right to nondiscrimination may be at odds, however, with the broader
language of ILO's Convention on Discrimination.7 8
72. See JULIA NIELSEN & DARIA TAGLIONI, A QUICK GUIDE TO THE GATS AND MODE 4 (2003).
73. ILO Supplementary Provisions Convention, supra note 36, at art 1(1).
74. See id.
75. Ryszard Cholewinski, The Rights of Migrant Workers, in INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION LAW:
DEVELOPING PARADIGMS AND CHALLENGES 258 (Ryszard Cholewinski, Richard Perruchoud & Euan
MacDonald eds., 2007).
76. ILO Supplementary Provisions Convention, supra note 36, at art 9(1).
77. See supra note 57.
78. The ILO Convention on Discrimination defines "discrimination" to include any distinction "on
the basis of race, colour, sex, religion, political opinion, national extraction or social origin." art. 1(a).
The Convention also, however, accords to the state the right to determine any further extension of its
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C. Nondiscrimination in the Right to Work and Conditions of Work
The Refugee Convention requires that refugees enjoy equality with
nationals regarding both to the right to work, and to labor legislation and
social security provisions. 79  In terms of the actual conditions of the
workplace, it is not surprising that the human rights treaties differ in their
level of specificity. The Civil and Political Covenant, which has the
broadest purview in terms of nondiscrimination, does not include economic
rights such as the right to work and to minimum standards in workplace
terms and conditions. The Economic Covenant recognizes the right to
work,80 and to "just and favourable conditions of work";8' developing
countries are not required to extend this to non-nationals, however, and in
any case the scope of these basic rights has not been specified in cases
where they would apply. 82
As for the other treaties dealing with labor rights, convergence appears
on the principle that, regardless of states' obligations to non-nationals, once
an employment relationship is initiated no discriminatory treatment of
migrant workers should be permitted. This principle of equality for actual
employment relations regardless of lawfulness is reflected in the Migrant
Workers' Convention.83  The Convention does otherwise distinguish in the
substantive economic rights granted to migrant workers on the basis of
documentary status, guaranteeing to undocumented workers only the right
to emergency medical care84 and the transferability of earnings upon
termination of employment, whereas documented workers enjoy an
scope. art. 1(b) ("Such other distinction ... may be determined by the Member"). Nevertheless,
particularly subsequent to the enshrinement of nondiscrimination as a "core" labor right in the 1998
Declaration on Fundamental Rights and Principles at Work, the ILO right to nondiscrimination is
understood to be of general application. For a discussion of the implications of this broad interpretive
scope, see Blackett & Sheppard, supra note 19, at 419.
79. See Refugee Convention, supra note 29, at arts. 17 & 24.
80. Economic Covenant, supra note 60, at art. 6(1) ("States Parties . . . recognize the right to
work").
81. Id. at art 7.
82. See id at art. 2(3).
83. The Migrant Workers' Convention grants treatment not less favorable than nationals with
respect to remuneration, "conditions of work" ("overtime, hours of work, weekly rest, holidays with
pay, safety, health, termination of the employment relationship"), other "terms of employment"
("minimum age of employment"). Migrant Workers' Convention, supra note 30, at art. 25. Moreover,
states parties "shall take all appropriate measures to ensure that migrant workers are not deprived of any
rights derived from this principle by reason of any irregularity in their stay or employment. In
particular, employers shall not be relieved of any legal or contractual obligations, nor shall their
obligations be limited in any manner by reason of such irregularity."
84. Migrant Workers' Convention, supra note 30, at art. 28.
85. Id. at art 32. Although the Convention does contain a provision on social security for
undocumented workers, id. at art. 27, it is nonbinding, stating only that social security may be granted as
long as provided for by law of state party; if state party does not allow, then Convention requests state
party to "examine the possibility of' reimbursement.
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ongoing right to transfer earnings and savings" and treatment no less
favorable than nationals in terms of taxation,87  and unemployment
benefits.8 8  Thus, even though states essentially maintain total control over
determining the terms on which migrant workers may enter, what kinds of
employment they may seek, and for how long,8 ' because the equality
principle attaches upon employment, the Migrant Workers' Convention can
be said to guarantee "basic economic, social and cultural rights to both
regular and irregular migrant workers." 90
The ILO also reflects the norm that, though in principle states parties
retain the right to distinguish between documented and undocumented
migrant workers, with only the former receiving guarantees of equal
treatment a priori,91 all workers are entitled to equal treatment regarding
past employment. Indeed, in this respect, the ILO exceeds the Migrant
Workers' Convention by including social security in this exception. 92
The ILO places another notable constraint on the state's authorization
of workers, by providing an automatic regularization for workers after a
period of not more than two years.93  The ILO's final gesture in the
direction of equality is to exhort, but not require, states parties "to pursue a
national policy designed to promote and to guarantee ... equality of
opportunity and treatment in respect of employment and occupation, of
86. Id. at art. 47.
87. Id. at art. 48.
88. Id. at art. 54.
89. Id. at art. 52.
90. Ryszard Cholewinski, The Rights of Migrant Workers, in INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION LAW:
DEVELOPING PARADIGMS AND CHALLENGES 259 (Ryszard Cholewinski, Richard Perruchoud & Euan
MacDonald eds., 2007).
91. ILO Migration for Employment Convention, supra note 35, at art 6(l)(a)(i), (b), (c)
(nondiscrimination with respect to remuneration and conditions of work, social security and taxes).
Nondiscrimination in work conditions is for lawful workers only (with exclusion of only a few particular
categories; see id at art. II (excluding "frontier workers, short-term entry of members of the liberal
professions and artistes, and seamen"; see also ILO Supplementary Provisions Convention, supra note
36, at art I1.
92. ILO Supplementary Provisions Convention, supra note 36, at art 9(1).
Without prejudice to measures designed to control movements of migrants for
employment by ensuring that migrant workers enter national territory and are admitted to
employment in conformity with the relevant laws and regulations, the migrant worker
shall, in cases in which these laws and regulations have not been respected and in which
his position cannot be regularized, enjoy equality of treatment for himself and his family in
respect of rights arising out of past employment as regards remuneration, social security
and other benefits.
93. The ILO Supplementary Provisions Convention does provide the right to work without
constraint after "a prescribed period of up to two years of lawful residence or, if the laws or regulations
of the State Party only provide for fixed-term contracts of less than two years, after completion of the
first work contract." Ryszard Cholewinski, The Rights of Migrant Workers, in INTERNATIONAL
MIGRATION LAW: DEVELOPING PARADIGMS AND CHALLENGES 258 (Ryszard Cholewinski, Richard
Perruchoud & Euan MacDonald eds., 2007).
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social security, of trade union and cultural rights and of individual and
collective freedoms." 94
In international trade law, the GATS system of specific commitments
places no automatic obligation on states to provide the right to work or to
meet any minimum standards in terms of workplace conditions. However,
there is the general most-favored nation treatment rule and also, within
specific commitments, the requirement of nondiscrimination in the form of
national treatment. States have the ability to list exceptions in schedules,
and many states use wage parity tests and economic needs tests before
permitting employment of foreign nationals.95
Rather than setting constraints on labor rights, the GATS expresses
nondiscrimination in terms of the regulation of trade flows: its market
access obligation for specific commitments bars the prohibition of services
by foreign nationals on the basis of quantitative restrictions such as number
of employees or market value of services provided.96 Because this
obligation applies only to specific commitments, however, states are free to
maintain such restrictions as long as they do not commit to do otherwise,
and indeed such restrictions are common.97
For those services that are listed as specific commitments, the question
arises as to whether qualification and licensing requirements might
constitute disguised protectionism. GATS requires that any such domestic
regulations be applied in a "reasonable, objective and impartial" manner.
This is further indicated to mean "not more burdensome than necessary,"
unless that burden could not have reasonably been anticipated at the time
the specific commitments were made. 98  Although earlier trade law
jurisprudence applied a relatively strict interpretation of this "necessity
test," to mean the least trade-restrictive possible measure, more recent
decisions by the WTO Appellate Body have softened this approach,
balancing the consideration of necessity against other considerations such
as "the importance of the common interests or values protected by that law
or regulation, and the accompanying impact of the law or regulation on
imports or exports." 99
94. ILO Supplementary Provisions Convention, supra note 36.
95. TRACHTMAN, supra note 10, at 250. The MONP Annex allows states to "regulate entry" as
long as no "nullification and impairment" which has been interpreted by some to mean "necessity test"
with regards to temporary workers; to date these requirements have not been challenged as
impermissible under these constraints.
96. GA TS, supra note 37, at Art XVI.
97. For example, the United States maintains numerical limits on business visas within its HI-B
and LI programs.
98. GATS, supra note 37, at Art VI:1.
99. Trachtman has noted that the necessity test as applied elsewhere in GATT/WTO has been
interpreted to mean the least trade restrictive possible, (Trachtman 261) though other more recent
decisions (such as the AB reports in EC Asbestos and Korea-Beef) set forth a balancing test that also
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The de jure framework for services, then, remains consistent with the
broad principle of nondiscrimination cabined by the pragmatic recognition
of states' ability to tailor that commitment. In addition to this de jure
framework, it should also be observed that, de facto, the specific
commitments that states have made tilt strongly toward professional
services. 100
D. Nondiscrimination in Freedom ofExpression, Association, and
Assembly
The Civil and Political Covenant establishes that "[e]veryone shall
have the right to freedom of association with others, including the right to
form and join trade unions for the protection of interests."101 At the same
time, this right is subject to "restrictions ... prescribed by law and
necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or
public safety, public order, the protection of public health or morals or the
protection of the rights and freedoms of others."' 02  Though such
restrictions might include those distinguishing documented from
undocumented workers, the prevailing interpretation of the Covenant based
on the statements of the Human Rights Committee is that a distinction on
the basis of documentary status would not hold.103
Based on this interpretation, the Migrant Workers' Convention accords
a level of protection somewhat lower than that found in the Civil and
Political Covenant: whereas documented workers may form and participate
in trade unions and exercise all attendant rights of expression, association,
and assembly, undocumented workers are not provided the right to form
associations, 104 only to take part in them.' 05 Hence, although "most of the
civil and political rights found in other more general human rights
instruments apply to all persons, including migrant workers ... irrespective
of legal status," 06 the ability of undocumented migrant workers to form
requires a "proportionality" type of analysis, considering "the importance of the common interests or
values protected by that law or regulation, and the accompanying impact of the law or regulation on
imports or exports." Appellate Body Report, Korea-Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and
Frozen Beef WT/DSl61/AB/R (Dec. 11, 2000).
100. Antonia Carzaniga, GA TS, Mode 4 and the Pattern of Commitments, in MOVING PEOPLE TO
DELIVER SERVICES (Aaditya Mattoo & Antonia Carzaniga eds., 2003). For Mode 4 commitments, 93%
of commitments are for high-skilled labor: 23% for business visitors, 28% for executives, managers or
specialists, 42% for employees transferring between branches of corporation.
101. Civil and Political Covenant, supra note 27, at art. 22(1).
102. Id. at art. 22(2).
103. See id.
104. Migrant Workers' Convention, supra note 30, at art 40.
105. Id. at art 26.
106. INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION LAW: DEVELOPING PARADIGMS AND CHALLENGES 259 (Ryszard
Cholewinski, Richard Perruchoud & Euan MacDonald eds., 2007).
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their own trade unions is not protected under international human rights
law.
The ILO has been still more circumspect in its explicit treatment of
migrant workers: the Migration for Employment Convention requires states
parties to allow only to lawful workers "membership of trade unions and
enjoyment of the benefits of collective bargaining." 0 7 Thus, undocumented
migrant workers enjoy the right to participate in, but not form, trade unions
under the Migrant Workers' Convention, but are not granted any such right
under the ILO Migration for Employment Convention.
On the other hand, the ILO Freedom of Association Convention
applies, on its own terms, "without distinction whatsoever"; and the
Collective Bargaining Convention requires "adequate protection against
acts of anti-union discrimination." The ILO's treatment of specific cases
involving the organizing rights of undocumented migrant workers has
suggested that they do enjoy rights under these latter conventions, which
are also held by the ILO to apply to all ILO members and not just signatory
states.' 08
E. Criminal Due Process
Although rights of criminal due process would not appear immediately
relevant to the migrant worker experience specifically, the often precarious
social position of migrants in some contexts renders the topic worthy of
consideration. This is particularly true in the case of undocumented
migrant workers, as well as asylum seekers, who are much more subject to
the threat of arrest, detention and deportation.' 09
The Civil and Political Covenant establishes a basic norm of
nondiscrimination in criminal process through its provision that "All
persons shall be equal before the courts and tribunals.""10 In addition,
though, minimum standards are laid out in the context of criminal due
process. These include the right to life and freedom from arbitrary
deprivation of life,"' freedom from torture,1 12 freedom from slavery of
various forms,' 13 freedom from arbitrary arrest,1 14 and the right to a fair and
107. ILO Migration for Employment Convention, supra note 35, at art 6(1)(a)(ii).
108. See infra Section I.F.
109. Shyla Vohra, Detention of Irregular Migrants and Asylum-Seekers, in INTERNATIONAL
MIGRATION LAW: DEVELOPING PARADIGMS AND CHALLENGES 49 (Ryszard Cholewinski, Richard
Perruchoud & Euan MacDonald eds., 2007).
110. Civil and Political Covenant, supra note 27, at art 14(1).
111. Id at art 6.
112. Id. at art 7.
113. Id at art 8 (prohibiting slavery and servitude).
114. Id. at art 9.
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public hearing without undue delay.11 The Migrant Workers' Convention
largely reflects the norms established in the Civil and Political Covenant,
with the striking exception that the provision of the right to life is not
accompanied by language forbidding arbitrary deprivation of life."'
Of all the treaties under consideration here, only the Civil and Political
Covenant and the Migrant Workers' Convention explicitly establish
protections for criminal due process, although the Refugee Convention
more generally does guarantee "free access" and national treatment for
refugees with respect to the court system.
This is perhaps not surprising with respect to the treaties explicitly
aimed toward economic ends, such as the ILO Conventions or the trade
agreements. It is perhaps more surprising that the Crime Convention and its
accompanying Protocols are silent as to internationally recognized
minimum standards for criminal due process.
The Crime Convention requires member states to criminalize
participation in a criminal group, money laundering, corruption of public
officials, and obstruction of justice;' 17 the Migrant Smuggling Protocol
requires member states to criminalize the transport of migrants without
valid travel documentation, and related uses of fraudulent travel
documents;" 8  the Trafficking Protocol requires member states to
criminalize the "trafficking of persons" as defined in the Protocol.119
115. Id. at arts 9 & 14.
116. Migrant Workers' Convention, supra note 30, at art. 9. Instead, the Convention provides that
the right to life shall be "protected by law."
117. Crime Convention, supra note 39, at art. 5 (establishing as an offense the act of "[ajgreeing
with one or more other persons to commit a serious crime for a purpose relating directly or indirectly to
the obtaining of a financial or other material benefit and, where required by domestic law, involving an
act undertaken by one of the participants in furtherance of the agreement or involving an organized
criminal group"; the "action" requirement is a consequence of the nonrecognition of the crime of
conspiracy in the civil law system); id. at art. 6 (establishing as an offense the "conversion or transfer of
property, knowing that such property is the proceeds of crime, for the purpose of concealing or
disguising the illicit origin of the property"); id. at art. 8 (establishing as an offense the "promise,
offering or giving to a public official" or "solicitation or acceptance by a public official," "directly or
indirectly, of an undue advantage, for the official himself or herself or another person or entity, in order
that the official act or refrain from acting in the exercise of his or her official duties"); Obstruction of
justice: Organized Crime Convention, art. 23 (establishing as a criminal offense, when committed
intentionally, "the use of physical force, threats or intimidation or the ... offering . . . of an undue
advantage to induce false testimony or to interfere in the giving of testimony or the production of
evidence" or to otherwise "to interfere with the exercise of official duties by a justice or law
enforcement official" in a proceeding in relation to the commission of offences covered by this
Convention" or otherwise to).
118. See Migrant Smuggling Protocol, supra note 40, at art. 6 (establishing as a criminal offense,
"when committed intentionally and in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material
benefit," smuggling of migrants, or producing, providing, procuring or possessing a fraudulent travel or
identity document when such acts "committed for the purpose of enabling the smuggling of migrants.
119. See Trafficking Protocol, supra note 41, at art. 5: requires criminalization of trafficking, as
defined in art. 3:
the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the
threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of
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The Crime Convention itself makes mention only of the domestic
criminal laws of states parties, and not of international standards. 120 The
accompanying Protocols on trafficking in persons and the smuggling of
migrants, however, do contain "saving" clauses, which provide that nothing
in the Protocols affects the rights and obligations of states under other
treaties. 121  Although these instruments require that the state establish
criminal procedures for particular offenses, however, they do not instruct
states to abide by any minimum standards as far as the fairness of those
procedures.
F. Doctrinal Relationships Between the Treaties
Viewing these treaties from the perspective of their treatment of
migrant workers, doctrinal convergences and divergences appear around the
central principle of nondiscrimination. In general, the human rights, trade,
and labor treaties emphasize the normative importance of the principle,
articulating it in several contexts. Within the human rights treaties, the
more general agreements (e.g., the Civil and Political Covenant) seem to
extend the principle further than the agreement specific to migrant workers,
the UN Migrant Workers' Convention, which more explicitly differentiates
the rights enjoyed by documented as opposed to undocumented workers.
The ILO agreements appear much more deferential to state territorial
control, with the important exception that, regardless of states' obligations
to non-nationals, once an employment relationship is initiated no
discriminatory treatment of migrant workers should be permitted.
The trade agreement, the GATS, states the principle of non-
discrimination forcefully as a general matter, in its provisions on most-
favored nation treatment and non-discrimination, but limits that principle
sharply in explicit application. Mode 4 applies only to temporary workers,
the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of
payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another
person, for the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the
exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced
labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of
organs.
The Protocol specifies "the consent of a victim of trafficking in persons to the intended exploitation [as
defined in the Protocol] shall be irrelevant where any of the means set forth in [the Protocol] have been
used." The definition of trafficking in the Protocol has been very controversial, particularly within
communities of feminist theorists and women's rights advocates. See Chantal Thomas, Manuscript, A
Critical Perspective on the International Law Against Trafficking in Persons (2002).
120. The one exception to this is a reference to international norms on the establishment of
jurisdiction. See Crime Convention, supra note 39, at art 15(6) ("Without prejudice to norms of general
international law, this Convention does not exclude the exercise of any criminal jurisdiction established
by a State Party in accordance with its domestic law").
121. Migrant Smuggling Protocol, supra note 40, at art 19; Trafficking Protocol, supra note 41, at
art 14.
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reserving to the state the right to determine conditions of permanent
residence and employment. Within Mode 4, states have complete
discretion as to which sectors of labor will be subject to GATS constraints.
Limitations on Mode 4 are largely the product of political economy-they
tend to represent areas in which government representatives determine that
some subset of interest groups influencing state behavior wishes to continue
policies of discrimination on the basis of national origin.
Considering these treaties in terms of the total effect of their
statements of principle and their reservation of exceptions, patterns of
convergence and divergence can be observed as represented graphically in
the chart on the next page:
Explicit Rights and Equalities Across Treaty Categories
Liberal Legality Against
Sovereignty:




Liberal Legality For 
-Human Rights
Sovereignty: ILO





This chart graphically renders the convergences and divergences in
international legal norms affecting migrant workers. Although international
law may be converging around a general set of principles or a "bill of
rights" for migrant workers,12 2 some differences are clearly visible. Those
differences can broadly be understood as the product of the tension between
a worldview of international law that envisions states as the primary actors,
122. T. Alexander Aleinikoff, International Legal Norms on Migration: Substance without
Architecture, in INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION LAW: DEVELOPING PARADIGMS AND CHALLENGES 467(Ryszard Cholewinski, Richard Perruchoud & Euan MacDonald eds., 2007).
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with ultimate sovereignty in discretion over territorial control on the one
hand, and a worldview that sees the rights of individuals as primary.
Within that general tension, further differences appear according to the
particularities of each treaty system. The labor conventions, for example,
peak in their emphasis on individual rights within the issue areas of
conditions of work and the right to organize. The trade agreement, despite
the normative clarity of the most-favored nation and national treatment
principles, remains largely deferential, but peaks in its assertiveness with
respect to conditions of work, as discrimination in that area is most
naturally seen as a constraint on conditions of competition in line with
economic concerns. The Refugee Convention states the principle of
nondiscrimination more strongly than its counterparts with respect to the
right to territorial entry, in keeping with that convention's emphasis on the
urgency surrounding the initial conditions creating refugee status, but
becomes noticeably more deferential if the criminal justice system is
invoked.
We have, then, a proliferation of "self-contained"l 2 3 treaty regimes
addressing one or more facets of migrant workers' experiences. In some
cases, treaties appear to be converging on the legal norms applicable to
migrant labor. In others, divergence is clearly visible. In still others, there
is at least potential ambiguity created by silence, as when general human
rights norms are not mentioned in other more specialized treaties.
These convergences and divergences can yield concrete problems of
legal interpretation. Consider the following hypothetical instances of inter-
treaty conflict on migrant workers' rights (assuming all states involved are
party to all the mentioned treaties):
1. Country X regularly arrests, detains, and deports
undocumented migrant workers without a public hearing, in
conjunction with the criminalization of the acts of procuring
and possessing fraudulent identity documents required by the
Crime Convention Protocol on Migrant-Smuggling. 12 4 Human
rights groups protest that such actions violate the workers'
rights to criminal due process, but Country X responds that
neither the Migrant-Smuggling Protocol nor the accompanying
123. INT'L LAW COMM'N, supra note 6.
124. The Migrant-Smuggling Protocol specifies that "Migrants shall not become liable to criminal
prosecution under this Protocol for the fact of having been the object of conduct" criminalized by the
Protocol such as the production of fraudulent identity documents. The phrasing of this exemption
suggests, however, that active participation by migrants in their own smuggling would indeed properly
render them subject to criminal prosecution under the Protocol.
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Crime Convention establishes any minimum standards in this
respect.
2. Country Y does not permit asylum seekers to work, leading
refugee lawyers to argue that the 1951 Refugee Convention
has been violated. Country Y responds that the Refugee
Convention applies only to recognized refugees, leaving
asylum seekers with the lesser protections of the Migrant
Workers' Convention and the ILO Conventions, which leave
to Country Y the prerogative to grant work authorization.
3. Country X establishes a visa system that provides workers
from Country Y with more favorable rules than those from
Country Z. Country Z protests that such distinctions violate
the human rights of Z citizens to nondiscrimination under the
Civil and Political Covenant as interpreted by the Human
Rights Committee. Country X responds that the WTO
General Agreement on Trade in Services permits distinctions
among nationals in visa systems and provides that such
distinctions are not violations of the Most-Favored Nation
Treatment principle according to the GATS Annex on the
Movement of Natural Persons.
4. Country Z prohibits undocumented migrant workers from
participating in trade unions. Country Z states that the ILO
Conventions applicable to migrant workers specify organizing
rights for lawful workers only. Trade union lawyers argue that
these workers are entitled to participate in trade unions under
both the Civil and the Political Covenant and the Migrant
Workers' Convention, as well as under the ILO conventions
on freedom of association and collective bargaining.
In each of the above problems, which side would prevail?
The apparent existence of gaps, conflicts, and ambiguities in the
articulation of diverging legal rules from different regimes need not compel
the conclusion that the legal relationship among these regimes cannot be
resolved or that a single applicable legal rule cannot be identified. In other
words, the divergences that result from plural legalities need not lead to a
conclusion of international legal fragmentation. Indeed, to a remarkable
extent, international lawyers can resolve apparent divergences in favor of




First, in some cases the texts of treaties themselves seek
harmonization, incorporating other treaty systems by reference, or limiting
their applicability in order to preserve a clear order among otherwise
potentially competing rules. For example, the Migrant Workers'
Convention explicitly excludes refugees and stateless persons. 125  The
Convention also explicitly places itself below any other more favorable
treatment available from other applicable treaties. 126 The Crime
Convention Protocols on Trafficking in Persons and Migrant-Smuggling
also contain "saving" clauses that clearly preserve the applicability of rules
from elsewhere in international law, including international human rights
law.127
In other cases, the treaties do not incorporate other rules
authoritatively, but nevertheless endorse a posture of harmonization and
compatibility. Thus, for example, the ILO Migration for Employment
Convention provides that states parties "undertake[] to respect the basic
human rights of all migrant workers,"128 thus encouraging the view that it
should be read as complementary to, rather than conflicting with, human
rights treaties that might offer more favorable treatment.
Even where there is no basis in the text or supporting documents, such
as travaux preparatoires or treaty body interpretations for construing a
relationship between treaties, international law does provide a series of
tools for addressing potential conflicts. The Vienna Convention establishes
broad principles of interpretation that encourage any given treaty provision
to be read in conjunction with all other "relevant rules of international
law."1 29 More specifically, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
establishes two somewhat mechanical techniques for resolving conflict:
first, where there is a dispute in which the states are subject to differing
treaties, the treaty to which all states are parties applies;' 30 and, second, that
where earlier and later treaties conflict, the earlier treaty applies only to the
extent that it is not incompatible with the later treaty.1 31
The Vienna Convention's somewhat mechanical approach, however,
has proven less useful with the rise of self-contained and specialized
regimes in which chronology may not reliably indicate the states' intent
125. Migrant Workers' Convention, supra note 30, at Art. 3.
126. Id. at art. 81 ("Nothing in the present Convention shall affect more favourable rights or
freedoms granted to migrant workers and members of their families by virtue of: (a) The law or practice
of a State Party; or (b) Any bilateral or multilateral treaty in force for the State Party concerned.")
127. See Migrant Workers' Convention, supra note 30.
128. ILO Supplementary Provisions Convention, supra note 36, at art. 1.
129. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, art. 31 (May 23, 1969)
[hereinafter Vienna Convention].
130. Id. at art 30(4).
131. Id. at art 30(2).
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with respect to earlier, potentially applicable treaties. Here, too,
international law seeks to resist an outcome of outright conflict, establishing
principles for order among regimes that cannot be simply differentiated on
the basis of chronology or membership. The International Law
Commission's important report on fragmentation highlighted two of these
tools. First, the principle of harmonization holds that, where possible, rules
of international law should be read "to give rise to a single set of
compatible obligations." 3 2 Second, the maxim lex specialis derogat legi
generali would allow the more specifically tailored rule to apply to govern
in the case of a potential conflict. 33 With these principles, international
law aspires to become a single, internally consistent set of rules
notwithstanding the emergence of specialized regimes.134
Applying these textual and doctrinal tools of interpretation to the
above hypothetical problems, they appear resolvable in ascending levels of
difficulty. Problem #1 is simply a matter of textual application: human
rights groups can reference the "saving" clause in the Migrant Smuggling
Protocol. As for Problem #2, the argument can be made that the ILO
conventions are intended to preserve intact the rights of refugees, given the
ILO Supplementary Provisions Convention's reference to the "human rights
of all migrant workers." Similarly, the Migrant Workers' Convention
excludes refugees and explicitly defers to more favorable treatment found in
the Refugee Convention or elsewhere. The Refugee Convention does not
clearly distinguish between recognized refugees and asylum seekers. This
textual silence, however, is resolved through reference to both state practice
and UN treaty bodies, each of which has established the distinction between
asylum seekers and recognized refugees. Thus, in Problem #2 a hierarchy
of norms is clearly demarcated, leaving asylum seekers with the protection
available from human rights generally but without the rights specifically
granted to refugees under the Refugee Convention. 135
Problem #3 reformulates one of the most challenging areas of potential
treaty regime conflict, between trade and human rights. Where trade rules
are silent as to human rights, should this be taken as incorporation by
reference so that the rules should be read complementarily, or, on the other
132. INT'L LAW COMM'N, UNITED NATIONS REPORT OF THE 58TH SESS. 428 (UN Doc. A/61/10)
(2006).
133. Id. at 428.
134. Id. at 427 ("International law is a legal system. Its rules and principles (i.e. its norms) act in
relation to and should be interpreted against the background of other rules and principles. As a legal
system, international law is not a random collection of such norms. There are meaningful relationships
between them. Norms may thus exist at higher and lower hierarchical levels, their formulation may
involve greater or lesser generality and specificity and their validity may date back to earlier or later
moments in time").
135. See WEISSBRODT, supra note 3, at 110-33.
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hand, does a trade rule "preempt" (even if it chronologically postdates) any
other potentially applicable rule? Much has been made of this "linkage"
question, though to date few have perceived the potential extension of this
question to the issue of the treatment of migrant workers. In trade
scholarship, however, a viewpoint appears to be emerging in line with the
position of the International Law Commission discussed above, that sees
both trade and human rights rules as part of a larger system of international
law, with particular provisions from particular regimes to be read as part of
a single legal system.136 On this view, certain prohibitions against visa-
based discrimination that arise from human rights law, for example visa
systems that can be proven discriminatory on racial grounds, 137 should be
read as qualifications to the WTO's permission of nationality-based visa
systems.
Problem #4 also cannot be solved on the face of the treaty texts
themselves, which do not specify their doctrinal relationships to each other.
Turning to surrounding interpretation, the ILO freedom of association and
collective bargaining conventions are, as a general matter, held to apply to
all ILO members regardless of whether they have formally been ratified. 138
However, should these conventions prevail over the narrower protections of
the specialized ILO Migration for Employment Convention when it has also
been ratified?
In this case, the maxim of lex specialis might allow the narrower rule
to prevail. On the other hand, the importance of freedom of association as a
"core" ILO labor standard might qualify it as a "non-derogable" or jus
cogens norm in the labor law context, allowing an override of the lex
specialis maxim. Only a very small number of human rights norms, such as
prohibition of slavery and forced labor, however, have been universally
136. ROBERT HOWSE & RUTI G. TEITEL, BEYOND THE DIVIDE: THE COVENANT ON ECONOMIC,
SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS AND THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION (2007); JOOST PAUWELYN,
CONFLICT OF NORMS IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW: How WTO LAW RELATES TO OTHER RULES OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2003).
137. See id.
138. See ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, supra note 34, 1 2. This
interpretation has been affirmed in numerous concrete instances. For example, the ILO Committee on
the Freedom of Association found wanting the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Hoffman Plastic
Compounds, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board, 535 U.S. 137 (2002) in which labor law remedies
were denied to undocumented workers. The Committee observed that "the impact of Hoffman ...
includes undocumented workers hired by employers in full knowledge of their status and who may
subsequently be dismissed for exercising their fundamental right to organize in an effort to ensure
respect for basic worker's rights." INT'L LAB. ORG. COMM. ON THE FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION,
COMPLAINT AGAINST THE UNITED STATES (2003). The Committee concluded that "the remedial
measures left [under U.S. labor law] in cases of illegal dismissals of undocumented workers are
inadequate to ensure effective protection against acts of anti-union discrimination." Id. 610.
(emphasis added).
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recognized as jus cogens, so the analysis of non-derogability would require
consideration of multiple contextual factors.139
Reference to some ILO jurisprudence and supporting work by eminent
labor law jurists140 points in favor of upholding the broader over the
narrower standard. First, the ILO Constitution provides that "in no case
shall the adoption of any Convention or Recommendation by the
conference, or the ratification of any Convention by any Member, be
deemed to affect any law . . . which ensures more favourable conditions to
the workers concerned."' 41 This provision was intended to refer only to the
relationship between national and international labor standards, rather than
to a conflict between international labor standards.'42 However, some
international labor law specialists have argued that extension of this logic to
conflicts between international instruments is supported by the
"'progressive' nature of labor law" and its normative commitment to social
progress, suggesting that "in the event of conflict, preference must be given
in principle to the standard which is the most favourable to workers." 43
Moreover, the ILO's compliance monitoring practices reflect the "principle
of the independent character of concurrent treaties" in which a state bound
by different standards remains bound to each. 144
On the other hand, other supporting material from the ILO suggests
that states should be able to establish differential labor standards for
migrant workers in general and undocumented migrant workers in
particular. The ILO's 2006 non-binding guidelines on labor migration
exemplify this more cautious posture.145  The guidelines do state a
commitment to a "rights-based approach" 46 and further state a preference
for the extension of all international labor standards to migrant workers.147
However, they are careful to preserve sovereign discretion in this regard by
providing that "international labour standards apply to migrant workers,
unless otherwise stated."48 Moreover, the guidelines reaffirm the limited
139. The International Law Commission specifies several factors to be weighed in a balancing-type
analysis: Whether such prevalence may be inferred from the form or the nature of the general law or
intent of the parties, wherever applicable; whether the application of the special law might frustrate the
purpose of the general law; whether third party beneficiaries may be negatively affected by the special
law; and whether the balance of rights and obligations, established in the general law would be
negatively affected by the special law. FRAGMENTATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 6, at
410.
140. Cf Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38(l)(d).
141. ILO Constitution, art. 19(8).
142. VALTICOS, supra note 55, at 73.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. ILO, MULTILATERAL FRAMEWORK ON LABOUR MIGRATION: NON-BINDING PRINCIPLES AND
GUIDELINES FOR A RIGHTS-BASED APPROACH TO LABOUR MIGRATION (2006).
146. Id. at 2.
147. Id. at 16.
148. Id. (emphasis added).
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position of the ILO Migration for Employment Convention that guarantees
equality only between nationals and regular migrant workers. 149  These
guidelines make no mention of the "progressive" interpretive lens
advocated by some jurists. Rather, they reaffirm a pragmatism that
ultimately defers to sovereign territorial control and refrains from casting
even core ILO labor standards in contravention of that deference insofar as
migration is concerned. The guidelines therefore suggest that the narrower
ILO Migration for Employment should prevail over the broader scope of
the ILO conventions on freedom of association and collective bargaining.
Coming back to Problem #4, the doctrinal murkiness created by
divergences in the ILO's interpretive approaches may nevertheless be
dispelled through deployment of the more mechanistic chronological rule
set out by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. 5 0  The
chronological test would ultimately uphold the broader UN Migrant
Workers' Convention rule, which allows trade union participation to
undocumented migrant workers, to prevail, assuming that the state ratified
the 1990 UN Convention at a date later than the 1949 Migration for
Employment Convention. Thus, looking to treaty body interpretations and
applying general rules of construction would probably resolve Problem #4
by recognizing an expansive interpretation of the right to organize in the
UN Migrant Workers' Convention and broader ILO jurisprudence emerging
over the narrower ILO Migration for Employment Convention position.
The above section demonstrates that international lawyers possess
tools of interpretation that can respond in many cases to the appearance of
incoherent or conflicting rules. Those tools, however, retain the
characteristics of legal analysis in any context: though some answers can
be neatly solved on the basis of established "bright-line" rules, others-
such as the latter two problems hypothesized above-necessitate an active
engagement with underlying normative commitments as well as a meta-
level commitment to coherence in the international order. In other words,
doctrinal divergences ultimately do expose the politics of plural legalities,
even if those divergences can be knit back together through mechanisms of
legal interpretation.
149. Id. ("In formulating national law and policies concerning the protection of migrant workers,
governments should be guided by the underlying principles of the Migration for Employment
Convention . . . particularly those concerning equality of treatment between nationals and migrant
workers in a regular situation. . . .") (emphasis added).
150. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties is pertinent to the resolution of apparent
conflicts in international labour obligations. See VALTICOS, supra note 55, at 74. However, according
to international labor law experts, the Vienna Convention should be applied only where principles are
not available from within the specialized jurisprudence of labor law. See id. at 73-74. This hierarchy of
interpretive practices of course itself reflects the Vienna Convention's maxim of lex specialis.
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II. NORMATIVE CONVERGENCES AND DIVERGENCES
The international lawyer's concern in the face of fragmentation is not
only doctrinal incoherence, but a dissolution of the overall aspiration
toward a harmonious international order. The concern is that:
specialized law-making and institution-building tends to take place with
relative ignorance of legislative and institutional activities in the
adjoining fields and of the general principles and practices of
international law. The result is conflicts between rules or rule-systems,
deviating institutional practices and, possibly, loss of an overall
perspective on the law.
Underneath the doctrinal question lies the specter of conflicting
politics that give rise to normative fragmentation: "normative orders that
are fundamentally different in their underlying conceptual structure."1 52 As
the International Law Commission's Report on Fragmentation remarked:
'Trade law' develops as an instrument to regulate international
economic relations. 'Human rights law' aims to protect the interests of
individuals and 'international criminal law' gives legal expression to the
'fight against impunity.' Each rule-complex or 'regime' comes with its
own principles, its own form of expertise and its own 'ethos,' not
necessarily identical to the ethos of neighboring specialization.153
Legal regimes can collide with each other not only in their specific
rules, but also in their larger goals. Thus, if as the report suggests, the
general thrust of trade law is to liberalize markets,' 54 and the general thrust
of human rights law is to protect individuals,15 and the general thrust of
labor law is to support workers,' 56 these regimes tend not to reach, formally
or informally, the issues posed by illegal migration. At the same time, the
general effect of criminalization, promoted both internationally and
nationally, may be viewed as hostile not only to the liberalization of
markets for migrant labor, but possibly also to the protection of individual
migrant workers.
"Global legal pluralism . .. is not simply a result of political pluralism,
but is instead the expression of deep contradictions between colliding
151. INT'L LAW COMM'N, supra note 9, at 11.
152. Merry, supra note 1, at 873.
153. INT'L LAW COMM'N, supra note 9, at 14.
154. The normative focus of international trade law on liberalization has been contested those who
would emphasize the trade regime's origination in a Fordist "embedded liberalism" that viewed
deregulation of trade as only one of a variety of governmental tools aimed at achieving full employment
and social welfare. See, e.g., Robert Howse, From Politics to Technocracy and Back Again: The Fate
ofthe Multilateral Trading System, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 94 (2002).
155. For a discussion of some of the internal complexities and external compromises of human
rights law, see DAVID KENNEDY, THE DARK SIDES OF VIRTUE (2004).
156. For a brief discussion of internal normative rifts between "economic and social" aspects of the
ILO, see supra notes 17-19 and accompanying text.
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sectors of a global society."l 57 Aleinikoff has conceptualized international
law on migration, similarly, as dividing into three general categories: those
treaties that see migration in terms of labor flows, those that see it as a
question of human rights, and those that emphasize state control and
security.
Among these three, the realm that most challenges "traditional notions
of state sovereignty,"' is that of human rights. International human rights
law formally extends liberal egalitarianism farther than international trade
or labor law, although how far depends on interpretive questions that have
yet to be resolved. At the same time, multilateral human rights enforcement
is ineffective in terms of the provision of recourse for individual
claimants. 160 The Migrant Workers Convention is hampered by a lack of
signatories. The Criminal and Political Covenant, although it has more
signatories and so could presumably be used to reinforce the principle of
protecting the human rights of undocumented migrant workers, is limited in
its ability to offer any recourse to right-holders. In addition, signatories like
the United States would argue, albeit not without controversy, that their
reservations to the treaty restrict potential right-holders to that recourse
offered under domestic constitutional law.161
The relative ineffectiveness of human rights regimes has led some
commentators to call for a more trade-centered approach to migration.162
Such an approach falters on the belief, central to many in international labor
law, that "labor is not a commodity."l 63 Nevertheless, some scholars have
argued that an economic approach may in fact yield the greatest welfare for
157. Andreas Fischer-Lescano & Gunther Teubner, Regime-Collisions: The Vain Search for Legal
Unity in the Fragmentation of Global Law, 25 MICH. J. INT'L L. 999, 1004 (2004).
158. T. Alexander Aleinikoff, International Legal Norms on Migration: Substance without
Architecture, in INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION LAW: DEVELOPING PARADIGMS AND CHALLENGES 467
(Ryszard Cholewinski, Richard Perruchoud & Euan MacDonald eds., 2007).
159. Id. at 469 ("human rights discourse counterbalances traditional notions of state sovereignty,
which view states as possessing unbridled authority to regulate immigration").
160. Regional human rights systems may harbor more potential. See Connie de la Vega and
Conchita Lozano-Batista, Advocates Should Use Applicable International Standards to Address
Violations of Undocumented Migrant Workers' Rights in the United States, 3 HASTINGS RACE &
POVERTY L.J. 35 (2005) (describing the Inter-American human rights system).
161. See 138 Cong. Rec. S4, 781-01 (Apr. 2, 1992) (setting forth Senate reservations to the Civil
and Political Covenant). For challenges to the validity of reservations, see Lori F. Damrosch, The Role
of the United States Senate Concerning "Self-Executing" and "Non-Self-Executing" Treaties, 67 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 515 (1991); David Weissbrodt, The United States Ratification of Human Rights
Covenants, 63 MINN. L. REV. 35 (1978).
162. See, e.g., Howard F. Chang, Liberalized Immigration as Free Trade: Economic Welfare and
the Optimal Immigration Policy, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 1147 (1997).
163. INT'L LAB. ORG., supra note 18. For a discussion of the conceptual and legal challenges to
viewing migrant labor as trade, see Jennifer Gordon, Explaining Immigration Unilateralism, 104 Nw. U.
L. REV. 3 (2010).
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the world's workers, making the case for the liberalization of migrants'
rights in the economist's language of gains from trade.164
The trade regime also would appear to hold the attraction of greater
institutional effectiveness than the human rights regime. As the discussion
above has suggested, however, the WTO has proven extremely pragmatic in
its extension of institutional authority to the question of migration and labor
regulation. Despite the relative strength of the World Trade Organization
generally, the existing subdivision governing trade in services is much less
effectual. This is because, as indicated above, in services the basic WTO
disciplines of nondiscrimination and national treatment apply only to those
sectors that are voluntarily made subject to them-in contrast to the rules
governing trade in goods or intellectual property, where these principles
automatically apply.' 65 And within the relatively weak division of trade in
services, those provisions governing migrant (temporary) labor are the
weakest and most qualified. The practical effect of the trade regime is to
confer the privileges of liberalization only to high-skilled workers. The
GATS by itself establishes almost no baseline, leaving the issue almost
entirely to the political will of states.
Within this arena of interstate relations and politics, the WTO has
managed to attract some attention to the issue of migrant labor. For the first
time ever, the WTO is fielding serious proposals by member states to
include negotiations on low-skilled labor migration. WTO members are
currently engaged in the "Doha" Round of Negotiations, launched by the
2001 WTO Ministerial Conference and accompanying Ministerial
Declaration (the "Doha Declaration") setting forth goals for negotiations.
The Doha Declaration states that "negotiations on trade in services shall be
conducted with a view to promoting the economic growth of all trading
partners and the development of developing and least-developed
countries."1 66 The negotiations on trade in services are expected to form an
important part of the results for the Doha round. The Declaration calls for a
focus on rules governing movement of natural persons and the effect of
those rules on prospects for development.
Developing-country members of the WTO are increasingly concerned
with addressing low-skilled labor migration head on, particularly since
many are significant exporters of such labor. Several countries have offered
proposals that would elaborate rules on the movement of natural persons,
and some of these proposals directly link movement of natural persons with
164. See, e.g., JAGDISH BHAGWATI, IN DEFENSE OF GLOBALIZATION (2004); TRACHTMAN, supra
note 10.
165. The Doha round includes an effort to expand the commitments under trade in services; since it
is subject to controversy, it is uncertain how this will turn out.
166. Ministerial Declaration, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1 (Nov. 14,2001).
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development.' 67 Perhaps the boldest call, however, has come from the
United Nations Development Programme, which has urged the negotiation
of WTO rules liberalizing constraints on low-skilled labor migration.168
There have also been some negotiations regarding creating a basis for easier
authorization of workers who fall into the GATS categories. The so-called
GATS visa has been promoted by the Indian government, and also by U.S.
and European businesses.' 69  This would effectively amend the GATS
Annex on the Movement of Natural Persons. However, with the Doha
negotiations in serious trouble for a host of reasons, the likelihood that
WTO Members will martial the political will necessary to extend
significantly GATS coverage is limited.
As suggested at the beginning of this section, state control and security
represent an important part of the normative spectrum in international law
affecting migrant labor. Whereas both human rights law and trade law can
be viewed as normatively driven by liberal individualism, each in different
ways recognizes the counterbalancing effect of the state, either explicitly, or
implicitly in institutional effect. Nevertheless, it might be argued that in
these areas of international law, at least conceptual primacy lies explicitly
with liberalism, and posits the state as a limiting factor. By contrast, the set
of treaties coordinating states' treatment of transnational crime-the Crime
Convention and the accompanying protocols on trafficking in persons and
migrant-smuggling-shift normative emphasis to state security. In these
instruments, state control and security are paramount, with individual rights
operating as the limiting factor.
There is no necessary doctrinal conflict between the "crime" treaties
and their counterparts in human rights, labor, and trade law insofar as
migrant workers are concerned, as Section II.F. above demonstrates. Even
where no doctrinal divergence exists, however, the crime treaties
potentially represent a normative divergence. As a normative matter, the
crime treaties may reinforce an association of migration with dangerous and
threatening criminal activity. The treaties establish bases for coordinating
167. See Communication from India, Proposed Liberalization of Movement of Professionals,
S/CSS/W/12 (Nov. 24, 2000); Communication from United States, Movement of Natural Persons,
S/CSS/W/29 (Dec. 18, 2000); Communication from Japan, Negotiating Proposal on Temporary
Movement of Natural Persons, S/CSS/W/4/S.2 (July 1, 2001); Communication from EC, Negotiating
Proposal on Temporary Movement of Service Suppliers, S/CSS/W/45; Communication from Canada,
Negotiating Proposal on Temporary Movement of Natural Persons Under GA TS (Mode 4), S/CSS/W/48
(Mar. 14, 2001); Communication from Colombia, Negotiating Proposal on Temporary Movement of
Natural Persons, S/CSS/W/97 (July 9, 2001).
168. UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME: MAKING GLOBAL TRADE WORK FOR PEOPLE
(2003).
169. Richard Self & B.K. Zutshi, WTO-World Bank Symposium on Movement of Natural Persons
(Mode 4) Under the GATS: Temporary Entry of Natural Persons as Service Providers: Issues and
Challenges in Further Liberalization under the Current GATS Negotiations (Apr. I1, 2002).
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the policing of borders against illegal migrants,170 by allowing states to
extend immigration-related investigations extraterritorially into commercial
carriers under the control or auspices of other states parties, 171 and by
consolidating repatriation practices for both "smuggled migrants" and
"trafficked persons." 72
The crime treaties are much more explicit and detailed in their
treatment of border control, of course, than the counterpart treaties in trade,
labor, or human rights. They give fairly detailed guidelineS 73 for the
coordination of law enforcement among member states in combating these
criminal offenses.174  If a state party refuses the request of another state
party to extradite an individual, it becomes subject to an obligation to
prosecute that individual internally. 75 There are also extensive provisions
regarding "mutual legal assistance" during the stages of criminal
investigation that antecede formal indictment and extradition.176  The
Trafficking Protocol, of course, has at its center the goal of reducing the
suffering of victims of "modern-day slavery." To that end, the Protocol
170. See Migrant Smuggling Protocol, supra note 40, at art. 11(1) ("Without prejudice to
international commitments in relation to the free movement of people, States Parties shall strengthen, to
the extent possible, such border controls as may be necessary to prevent and detect the smuggling of
migrants.").
171. See id.; Trafficking Protocol, supra note 41, at art. 11.
172. See, e.g., Migrant Smuggling Protocol, supra note 40, at art. 18(1) ("Each State Party agrees to
facilitate and accept, without undue or unreasonable delay, the return of a person who has been the
object of conduct set forth in article 6 of this Protocol and who is its national or who has the right of
permanent residence in its territory at the time of return."); Trafficking Protocol, supra note 41, at art.
8(1) ("The State Party of which a victim of trafficking in persons is a national or in which the person had
the right of permanent residence at the time of entry into the territory of the receiving State Party shall
facilitate and accept, with due regard for the safety of that person, the return of that person without
undue or unreasonable delay.").
173. There is also a more general obligation to cooperate. See Crime Convention, supra note 39, at
art. 27 ("States Parties shall cooperate closely with one another, consistent with their respective
domestic legal and administrative systems," especially in aid of conducting inquiries regarding identity
of persons or property related to crimes; and general exchange of information). The Crime Conventions
has established progressively more extensive obligations relating to extradition. For an account of this
progression toward "thick" institutional obligations, see Chantal Thomas, Disciplining Globalization, 24
MICH. J. INT'L L. 549 (2004) ("The 2000 Convention . . .. developed additional mechanisms to increase
efficacy in criminal enforcement . . . expanded subject matter jurisdiction . . . encourages the use of
"special investigative techniques, such as electronic or other forms of surveillance and undercover
operations" to aid enforcement . . . and requires members to 'institute a comprehensive domestic
regulatory and supervisory regime for banks and non-bank financial institutions ... in order to deter and
detect all forms of money laundering.").
174. A state party to the Crime Convention must ensure a minimum domestic criminal law
environment by establishing formal sanctions for the Convention's defined criminal offenses. See
Crime Convention, supra note 39, at art. 11. States Parties must make criminal such offenses not only
when they involve a transnational component, but also even if they are wholly domestic. Id. at art. 34.
175. See Crime Convention, supra note 39, at art. 16(10) ("A State Party in whose territory an
alleged offender is found, if it does not extradite such person in respect of an offence to which this
article applies solely on the ground that he or she is one of its nationals, shall, at the request of the State
Party seeking extradition, be obliged to submit the case without undue delay to its competent authorities
for the purpose of prosecution.").
176. See Crime Convention, supra note 39, at art. 18 .
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does contain language promoting the protection of human rights of
trafficking victims. However, whereas the Protocol's language relating to
criminalization and repatriation establishes mandatory obligations, the
provisions relating to assistance of victims and human rights protection are
aspirational. "
The crime treaties also appear quite robust institutionally when
compared with their counterparts in trade and human rights. They have
many more participating members than the UN Migrant Workers
Convention, the ILO migrant labor conventions, or the General Agreement
on Trade in Services.' 7 8  Moreover, unlike the former, the international
criminal law treaties contain a great deal of administrative obligations-
specifications as to how states parties should go about implementing the
treaty's provisions. The apparatus established by these conventions is thus
much broader in its purview and its authority.
Both because of their explicit normative emphasis on security, and
because of their institutional authoritativeness, the crime treaties may create
an effect of throwing a shadow of suspicion over entire regions of the world
that are viewed thereafter as suppliers of criminality. Certainly, in a post-
9/11 world in which major political powers have declared an ongoing state
of heightened alert, the social atmosphere may be one in which popular
concerns in developed countries around increased economic instability in
the globalization era very easily dovetails with increases in perceived
criminal dangers beyond borders.
The normative ordering described above could, by some, be perceived
as a legitimate, if controversial, corollary of the sociolegal facts of national
identity, territorial sovereignty, and citizenship. However, the social
benefits of policing identity must be considered in light of the probable
social costs, which include the ironic, or tragic, likelihood that criminalizing
177. Compare Trafficking Protocol, supra note 41, at art. 5 on criminalization (states "shall ...
establish as criminal offenses") and art. 8 on repatriation (states "shall facilitate and accept . . . the return
of [a "victim of trafficking"]") with id. at art. 6 on the establishment of social services programs (states
"shall consider implementing measures to provide for the physical, psychological and social recovery of
victims") and art. 7 on the status of victims (states "shall consider adopting ... measures that permit
victims of trafficking ... to remain in ... territory").
178. Although all WTO members are formally signatories to the GATS, the fact that GATS
principles apply only to those sectors for which Members have actively made concessions, and the fact
that only a minority of Members have made such concessions, effectively means the level of
participation is low. See Sungjoon Cho, Development by Moving People: Unearthing the Development
Potential of a GATS Visa, in DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN THE WTO LEGAL SYSTEM 457 (Joel P.
Trachtman & Chantal Thomas eds., 2009) (stating that the "the ratio of full liberalization in Mode 4
market access ranges from 0 to 4%, compared with 18-59% in Mode I (cross-border, such as e-
commerce), 24-69% in Mode 2 (consumption abroad, such as foreign outpatients), and 0-31% in Mode
3 (commercial presence, such as foreign subsidiaries.").
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markets in many cases probably does not decrease them, but only renders
them more violent.179
CONCLUSION: POLITICS AND PLURAL LEGALITIES
The above sections have examined international legal regimes
potentially governing migrant labor. The foregoing has argued that
disparate treaties may converge or diverge both doctrinally and
normatively. On the one hand, the principle of nondiscrimination can
challenge sovereignty, reflecting the logical extension of a liberal legal
internationalism that paradoxically consumes its own original subjects, the
states that established it. In this progressionist narrative, aspects of the
legal identity of states, including the right to police borders, become
increasingly challenged. On the other hand, against this dynamic of
liberalism, an antagonistic or mediating principle of the necessity for
policing and border control can be seen in all the treaties analyzed above,
but most clearly in the regime of criminalization. In this view, it is
precisely the larger liberalization of orders that justifies and requires states
to intervene to prevent illegality and to preserve the underlying construct of
the original order.
In the former view, migrant workers register primarily as human
beings. Their legal subjectivity becomes relevant under a conceptual and
doctrinal paradigm that identifies individuals as the ultimate and sacrosanct
constituents of law. The latter view adopts a lens of sovereignty that
continues to see states as the primary occupants of the legal terrain, with
both rights and responsibilities relating to territoriality. Here, migrant
workers register primarily as objects of governance in a paradigm that
privileges border control as a prerogative of states.
For a topic as politically fraught as immigration, and particularly
immigrants who are active participants in domestic job markets, this
normative tension becomes even more important. From a migrant worker
advocate's perspective, where there is divergence, there is the danger that
the divergence will be exploited by those hostile to non-citizens as a group;
that is, that more antagonistic norms toward migrant workers will prevail.' 80
Indeed, the emergence of different rule systems within human rights,
labor, trade, and crime regimes in international law appears to embody not
179. Chantal Thomas, Undocumented Migrant Workers in a Fragmented International Order, 25
MD. J. INT'L L. 187 (2010).
I80. Cf WEISSBRODT, supra note 3, at 37 (identifying the general problem that "treaties function as
creating common moral standards" but gaps can allow countries to justify "noncompliance" and in
particular the problem that "international law and thematic mechanisms relating to non-citizens have
[traditionally] focused on non-citizen sub-groups while neglecting broader protections for non-citizens
as a whole" and calling for "clear, comprehensive standards governing the rights of non-citizens").
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just legal pluralism, but also legal fragmentation: "the emergence of
specialized and (relatively) autonomous rules or rule-complexes, legal
institutions, and spheres of practice."'81 These self-contained systems may
diverge at the level of the overarching set of principles or the "ethos"' 82 of a
system of laws. Some commentators have responded to the plural legalities
of international migration by calling for consolidation: an international
"Bill of Rights" for migrant workers,' 8 for example, or more ambitiously,
an institution such as a "World Migration Organization." 184 Others assert
that normative convergence is already building not only in the academy but
also in practice and in policy,18  through various "modes of norm
production, regime creation and management" that include international
conventions, regional norms, customary international law, national
implementation processes, and state cooperation.18 6
For these jurisprudential discourses, important questions are posed by
convergence and divergence in the way treaties address migrant workers in
terms of both specific doctrinal questions and underlying norms and
principles.
If for jurists, this untidiness is disconcerting, for those with even
higher stakes it is more so. For advocates of migrant worker rights, the
fractured quality of laws on migrant labor may illuminate the depth of the
gap between treaties as "standards of global justice" and the reality that
migrant workers may face.
181. INT'L LAW COMM'N, supra note 6, at 9.
182. INT'L LAW COMM'N, supra note 134, at 11.
183. Aleinikoff, supra note 4, at 477.
184. See, e.g., Jagdish Bhagwati, The World Needs a New Body to Monitor Migration, FINANCIAL
TIMES, Oct. 24, 2003, at 24; Bimal Ghosh, Towards a New International Regime for Orderly Movements
ofPeople, in MANAGING MIGRATION: TIME FOR A NEW INTERNATIONAL REGIME? 6 (Bimal Ghosh ed.,
2000).
185. See HOWSE & TEITEL, supra note 140. A number of intergovernmental dialogues on
migration, such as the UN High-Level Dialogue on International Migration and Development,
September 14-15, 2006, and the Berne Initiative of the Swiss Federal Office for Refugees, and the
Global Migration Group. Several international organizations maintain extensive ongoing policy
divisions on intergovernmental coordination, such as the International Organization for Migration's
Commission on Global Governance. For more information on such activities, see TRACHTMAN, supra
note 10, at 15-23.
186. Aleinikoff, supra note 4, at 471.
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